Monthly Newsletter

Notice and Announcements

SAVE THE DATE – TCAA Fall Conference

The 2025 TCAA Fall Conference will take place on October 30, 2025, in Ft. Worth, and will be held in conjunction with the TML Annual Conference.

89th Legislative Session

The 2025 legislative session concluded on June 2. The bill summaries of the legislation that passed are available here.

TCAA Online Membership Directory

Looking to find the contact information for a fellow TCAA member? You can find it using the TCAA membership directory, available here.

IMLA Membership 

Membership with IMLA doesn’t just mean discounts to their events. It’s much more than that. Click here to view a quick video about IMLA membership.

Continuing Legal Education

2024 Fall Conference and Paralegal Program Webinars 

These TCAA online seminars are FREE, allowing TCAA members who are city attorneys, assistant city attorneys, or attorneys who regularly practice municipal law to view the videos from the conferences in a single–session format. Viewing a session allows attorneys to receive participatory CLE credit with the State Bar. To view these seminars, please visit https://vimeo.com/tcaawebinars/collections. If you need the password, please email TCAA@tml.org. 

TCAA/TML Legal Defense Program: Amicus Briefs and Comments Filed

TCAA, in conjunction with the Texas Municipal League, files amicus briefs and comments in support of cities on many issues. To keep up to date on the status of these issues, go to: https://www.tml.org/DocumentCenter/View/5389/AmicusBriefUpdate.

Recent Federal Fifth Circuit Cases of Interest to Cities

Note: Included cases are from May 1, 2025, through May 31, 2025. These case summaries have been prepared with the assistance of AI.

Employment Discrimination: Alusi v. City of Frisco, Tex., No. 24-40626, 2025 WL 1260446 (5th Cir. May 1, 2025) (per curium). Safealdean Alusi, an ethnic Iraqi, filed a lawsuit against the City of Frisco after being terminated from his position as a city firefighter, alleging national origin discrimination. Alusi’s claims included a hostile work environment, unlawful termination, and retaliation under federal law. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of the city, concluding that Alusi failed to establish a prima facie case for any of his claims. Alusi appealed the district court’s decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

The appellate court reviewed the briefs, the record, and applicable law, and also heard oral arguments. Upon review, the appellate court found no reversible error in the district court’s ruling. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment to the City of Frisco.

State-Law Immunity: Anthology, Inc. v. Tarrant Cnty. Coll. Dist., 136 F.4th 549 (5th Cir. 2025). Anthology, Inc. entered a 10-year contract with Tarrant County College District (TCCD) to provide software products and services, but TCCD terminated the contract early without paying the required termination fee. Anthology sued TCCD in federal court for breach of contract, seeking declaratory relief and damages. TCCD moved to dismiss the case, arguing it was entitled to immunity from suit under Texas law, state sovereign immunity, lack of diversity jurisdiction, and statutory bars to damages. The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, citing Texas state-law immunity from suit, without addressing the other grounds for dismissal. Anthology appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its jurisdictional determination.

The appellate court noted that state-law immunities cannot limit federal court jurisdiction, which is defined by Congress and the Constitution. The district court’s reliance on Texas state-law immunity was incorrect because such immunities are non-jurisdictional, merits-based defenses in federal court. The appellate court identified that the district court failed to address the jurisdictional issues of state sovereign immunity and lack of complete diversity, which must be considered first. Consequently, the appellate court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to address the jurisdictional issues properly.

Retaliation & Qualified Immunity: Atkins v. Hopkins, 137 F.4th 286 (5th Cir. 2025). Yolanda Atkins, a former city employee, sued Patrick Hopkins, an alderman in the City of Macon, Mississippi, alleging First Amendment retaliation after he declined to second a motion to reappoint her as a city employee, following her mayoral run against his preferred candidate. The district court denied Hopkins’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, finding a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Hopkins’s actions were motivated by Atkins’s protected speech. Hopkins appealed the denial of summary judgment, arguing that his conduct did not clearly violate Atkins’s First Amendment rights.

The appellate court reviewed the legal question of whether Hopkins’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law. Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials are protected unless their conduct violates clearly established rights. The court noted that for a right to be clearly established, existing precedent must make the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. The court found that Hopkins, as a non-final decisionmaker, did not have the power to unilaterally terminate Atkins and did not recommend her removal or set in motion a disciplinary process. The court concluded that existing precedent did not clearly establish that Hopkins’s conduct violated Atkins’s First Amendment rights. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment and remanded the case, granting Hopkins qualified immunity.

Discrimination / Failure to Promote: Fry v. City of Hernando, Mississippi, No. 24-60532, 2025 WL 1378750 (5th Cir. May 13, 2025) (per curiam). Willie Fry, a former firefighter for the City of Hernando, Mississippi, applied for a promotion to the position of driver but failed the required promotional exam three times, in 2018, 2020, and 2021. In 2018, a black male was promoted, but in 2020 and 2021, only white men passed the exam and were promoted. Fry sued the city, alleging racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, but the district court found he did not provide sufficient evidence to show he was passed over due to his race and entered judgment in favor of the city. Fry, proceeding pro se, sought reconsideration, which was denied, and he subsequently appealed.

On appeal, Fry challenged the district court’s summary judgment ruling and the denial of his motion to reconsider. The appellate court reviewed the summary judgment de novo, considering all facts in favor of Fry, the nonmoving party. The court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, requiring Fry to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, which he failed to do as he did not demonstrate he was qualified for the driver position. The court found no competent evidence that Fry passed the promotional exam, an essential element of his claim. Regarding the motion to reconsider, the appellate court reviewed for abuse of discretion and found no legitimate grounds for reconsideration, as ineffective assistance of counsel is not a valid basis in civil cases. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment and denial of Fry’s motion to reconsider.

Removal: Abraham Watkins Nichols Agosto Aziz & Stogner v. Festeryga, No. 23-20337, 2025 WL 1420220 (5th Cir. May 16, 2025). A Texas law firm, Abraham Watkins Nichols Agosto Aziz & Stogner, sued its former associate, Edward Festeryga, in state court, alleging he took clients and firm files to his new practice. Festeryga removed the case to federal court within the 30-day statutory window, citing diversity jurisdiction due to his Canadian citizenship. The district court remanded the case, concluding that Festeryga waived his removal rights by filing a motion to dismiss in state court. Festeryga appealed, arguing that the district court erred in finding waiver, while the law firm contended that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review remand orders based on waiver.

Initially, a panel of the appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, bound by the precedent set in In re Weaver, which treated waiver-based remand orders as jurisdictional. The en banc court, however, overruled Weaver, holding that a remand based on waiver is not jurisdictional and does not fall under the bar on appellate review, because waiver is a common-law doctrine and not a statutory defect in the removal process. The court emphasized that waiver does not affect the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, which is derived from the Constitution and Congress. Consequently, the appellate court concluded that it had jurisdiction to review the remand order and returned the case to the original panel to resolve remaining issues. The decision clarified that waiver-based remand orders do not fall within the statutory bar to appellate review under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).

Failure to Accommodate: Strife v. Aldine Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 24-20269, 2025 WL 1416073 (5th Cir. May 16, 2025). Alisha Strife, a former U.S. Army member with service-related disabilities, requested that her service dog accompany her at work in the Aldine Independent School District (AISD) to accommodate her disabilities. AISD delayed approving her request for six months, during which Strife provided multiple medical documents supporting her need for the service dog. Strife filed a lawsuit alleging failure to accommodate, hostile work environment, disability discrimination, retaliation, and interference under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Texas disability laws. The district court dismissed her failure-to-accommodate and hostile work environment claims and granted summary judgment for AISD on the other claims.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal and summary judgment de novo. The appellate court found that Strife’s allegations could support a claim of failure to accommodate due to AISD’s delay and lack of good faith in the interactive process. However, the court agreed with the lower court that Strife’s hostile work environment claim was insufficient, as the alleged harassment was not pervasive or severe. The court also upheld the summary judgment on the disability discrimination claim, noting that Strife did not suffer an adverse employment decision, and the appellate court found AISD had a legitimate reason for requesting an independent medical exam, negating Strife’s retaliation claim. Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the failure-to-accommodate claim, affirmed the dismissal of the hostile work environment claim, and affirmed the summary judgment on the other claims, remanding the case for further proceedings.

Title VII Discrimination and Retaliation: Wilkerson v. Jefferson Par., No. 21-30716, 2025 WL 1420530 (5th Cir. May 16, 2025). Dominique Wilkerson worked for the Jefferson Parish Department of Juvenile Services as a probationary supervisor and was terminated after receiving a performance evaluation rating her as “below expectations.” She filed claims of sex and race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and state law, as well as a race discrimination claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court dismissed the official-capacity claims against two individuals and granted summary judgment in favor of Jefferson Parish, dismissing Wilkerson’s claims with prejudice. Wilkerson appealed the dismissal of her Title VII claims.

The appellate court used the McDonnell Douglas framework to analyze Wilkerson’s discrimination claims, which require establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Wilkerson failed to identify proper comparators who were treated more favorably under nearly identical circumstances, as required to establish a prima facie case. The court found that the employees Wilkerson named as comparators were not similarly situated due to differences in employment status, conduct, and performance evaluations.

Regarding the retaliation claim, the court acknowledged that Wilkerson engaged in protected activity by complaining about discriminatory conduct, but she failed to provide evidence of pretext for retaliation. The court noted that Wilkerson’s arguments about the intentions behind her termination were speculative and insufficient to demonstrate that the adverse employment action would not have occurred but for her complaint. Ultimately, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that Wilkerson did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination or provide evidence of pretext for retaliation.

First Amendment Retaliation & Qualified Immunity: Wetherbe v. Tex. Tech Univ. Sys., No. 19-11325, 2025 WL 1442699 (5th Cir. May 20, 2025). Professor James Wetherbe, known for his anti-tenure views, alleged that Lance Nail, the then-dean of Texas Tech University’s business school, retaliated against him for his public criticism of tenure. Wetherbe claimed that Nail’s actions, including removing him from teaching assignments and revoking his emeritus status, were in response to his anti-tenure publications. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that Wetherbe sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation and that Nail’s actions were objectively unreasonable. The defendants appealed, arguing that Nail was entitled to qualified immunity.

The appellate court focused on whether Wetherbe’s speech was clearly established as a matter of public concern at the time of the alleged retaliation. The court noted that no clearly established law from August 2013 to March 2015 indicated that Wetherbe’s speech on tenure was a matter of public concern. The court emphasized that the law must be particularized to the facts of the case and that general legal principles were insufficient to establish a clearly established right. Consequently, the court held that Nail was entitled to qualified immunity because he did not have fair notice that his conduct was unlawful. The appellate court reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity and rendered judgment in favor of Nail. The court did not address Wetherbe’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the current dean, as the district court had not ruled on those claims.

Title VII Discrimination & Retaliation: Franks v. City of Oxford, Mississippi, No. 24-60295, 2025 WL 1442701 (5th Cir. May 20, 2025) (per curiam). Renika Franks, a police officer, appealed the dismissal of her employment discrimination and retaliation claims against the City of Oxford, Mississippi, and the Oxford Housing Authority. Franks began working for the city in 2015 and transferred to the Oxford Housing Authority (OHA) in 2017, where she was initially considered the senior officer. In 2021, a new position, Resident Security and Services Coordinator, was created, and Franks applied but was not selected; instead, Officer Cody Pruitt was chosen. Franks filed Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charges alleging racial discrimination and later sued, claiming the hiring process was a pretext to demote her in favor of Pruitt. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that Franks failed to show that the city’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for hiring Pruitt was a pretext.

On appeal, Franks argued that the district court erred in dismissing her discrimination claims and that the city’s reasons for hiring Pruitt were pretextual. The appellate court found that the officer-in-charge title was unofficial and did not support Franks’s claim of pretext. Additionally, the court noted that Franks failed to provide evidence of racial animus or inconsistent explanations for Pruitt’s hiring. The court also rejected Franks’s retaliation claim, as she could not show a causal connection between her EEOC charges and the elimination of her position. Ultimately, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment, agreeing that Franks did not establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext or retaliation.

First Amendment – Library Book Removals: Little v. Llano Cnty., No. 23-50224, 2025 WL 1478599 (5th Cir. May 23, 2025). In this case, patrons of the Llano County library sued the library director and county officials, alleging that they removed 17 books due to objections to their treatment of racial and sexual themes, violating the patrons’ First Amendment rights. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss and granted a preliminary injunction, ordering the books to be returned to the shelves, finding that the removals were likely motivated by a desire to limit access to certain viewpoints. The defendants appealed, arguing that the removals were part of a standard “weeding” process and that the library’s collection decisions were government speech not subject to First Amendment challenges. 

The appellate court, sitting en banc, reversed the preliminary injunction and dismissed the free speech claims, holding that the right to receive information does not apply to a library’s decision to remove books. The court reasoned that the First Amendment does not entitle individuals to demand that the government provide access to specific books in a library. It also held that a library’s collection decisions are government speech, which is not subject to Free Speech challenges. The court emphasized that libraries have historically curated their collections to express their views on worthwhile literature. The court overruled its previous decision in Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish School Board, 64 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 1995), which had allowed challenges to book removals in school libraries. The court found that the district court applied incorrect legal principles by granting the preliminary injunction based on a supposed right to receive information. The court noted that the removal of books does not prevent individuals from accessing them elsewhere, such as online or through other libraries. Ultimately, the appellate court’s decision reversed the district court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

The dissent argued that the majority’s decision undermines core First Amendment principles and allows for government censorship in public libraries.

Qualified Immunity / Excessive Force: Salinas v. City of Houston, No. 23-20617, 2025 WL 1478579 (5th Cir. May 23, 2025). Houston police officers Manuel Salazar and Nestor Garcia fatally shot David Anthony Salinas on July 14, 2021, following a high-speed chase during a sting operation. Salinas’ widow, Brittany Salinas, filed a lawsuit against the officers and the City of Houston, claiming violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA), and the state-created danger theory of constitutional liability. The district court dismissed the claims, finding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity and that the claims against the city were meritless. Brittany appealed, arguing that the officers violated Salinas’ Fourth Amendment rights through unlawful detention and excessive force.

The appellate court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Salinas, as they had information on a vehicle partially matching his and reported that he was refusing to stop. The court also determined that the officers’ use of lethal force was not excessive, as Salinas continually disregarded commands and reached within his vehicle, leading the officers to reasonably believe he posed a threat. The court noted that the officers did not see Salinas with a gun but were justified in using lethal force based on their belief that he was reaching for a weapon. Brittany’s claims against the City of Houston were also dismissed, as the court found no constitutional injury and determined that the TTCA did not waive the city’s sovereign immunity. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Brittany’s claims against the officers and the city. The court concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity and that Brittany’s pleadings did not establish municipal liability under § 1983.

State Action & Qualified Immunity: Heidi Group, Inc. v. Tex. Health & Human Services Comm’n, No. 23-50303, 2025 WL 1509395 (5th Cir. May 28, 2025). The Heidi Group, Inc. alleged that Texas officials violated the Fourth Amendment and state law by conspiring with a former employee to steal documents from a cloud-based storage system. The district court denied the officials’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, rejecting their immunity defenses. The officials appealed, challenging the denial of qualified immunity, official immunity, and the dismissal of a religious discrimination claim.

The appellate court found jurisdiction over the appeal regarding qualified immunity and official immunity but not over the religious discrimination claim. The court determined that only one person, Gaylon Dacus, engaged in state action by using the former employee as an agent to search Heidi’s files. Dacus was not entitled to qualified immunity because he did not secure a subpoena and conducted a secret investigation, violating Heidi’s Fourth Amendment rights. The court rejected Dacus’s argument that Heidi had no reasonable expectation of privacy in its documents, as the content was protected under the Fourth Amendment. The court also found that the contract with Texas did not grant unrestricted access to Heidi’s records. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of Dacus’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the appeal regarding the religious discrimination claim.

Recent Texas Cases of Interest to Cities

Note: Included cases are from May 1, 2025, through May 30, 2025. These case summaries have been prepared with the assistance of AI.

Tort Claims Act: City of Mesquite v. Wagner, No. 23-0562, 2025 WL 1271294 (Tex. May 2, 2025). In this case, the Supreme Court of Texas addressed whether the City of Mesquite could claim governmental immunity in a lawsuit filed by Anthony Wagner, who was bitten by a police service dog during a burglary arrest. Wagner alleged that the injury was due to the police officer’s negligent handling of the dog, Kozmo, and claimed that the city’s immunity was waived under the Texas Tort Claims Act. The city argued that the officer was protected by official immunity, which would extend to the city, because he acted in good faith while performing discretionary duties within his authority. The court of appeals had previously ruled against the city, stating that it failed to prove that a reasonably prudent officer could have believed no further safeguards were necessary. However, the Supreme Court reversed this decision, finding that the city provided sufficient evidence of the officer’s good faith, as his actions were justified under the circumstances. Consequently, the court dismissed Wagner’s claim for lack of jurisdiction, affirming the city’s immunity.

Land Use: PDT Holdings, Inc. v. City of Dallas, No. 23-0842, 2025 WL 1271688 (Tex. May 2, 2025). PDT Holdings, Inc. and Phillip Thompson Homes, Inc. (the builder) constructed a duplex in Dallas that exceeded the city’s height limit due to misleading information from city officials. The city initially approved a 36-foot height limit but later issued a stop-work order based on a 26-foot limit under the residential-proximity-slope ordinance, which the builder was not informed about. Despite the builder’s efforts to amend plans and seek variances, the city denied the requests, leaving the nearly complete duplex unusable. The trial court ruled in favor of the builder, applying equitable estoppel against the city, but the court of appeals reversed this decision. The Supreme Court of Texas reinstated the trial court’s judgment, finding sufficient evidence of the city’s false representations and the builder’s reasonable reliance on them. The court concluded that estoppel was necessary to prevent manifest injustice and would not interfere with the city’s governmental functions.

Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Elliott v. City of Coll. Station, No. 23-0767, 2025 WL 1350002 (Tex. May 9, 2025). Property owners Shana Elliott and Lawrence Kalke challenged two ordinances of the City of College Station, which regulated off-premise signage and driveway construction in the city’s extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ), arguing that such regulation was unconstitutional under the Texas Constitution. The city argued that the constitutional claim was nonjusticiable, asserting that the form of local government is a political question for the legislature. While the case was pending, the legislature amended the law to allow ETJ residents to opt out of a city’s ETJ, potentially mooting the constitutional claims. The Supreme Court of Texas vacated the lower court judgments and remanded the case to allow the property owners to complete the opt-out process, emphasizing the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. The Court noted that the statutory opt-out process provided a nonjudicial means of relief, which could alleviate the plaintiffs’ concerns.

Tort Claims Act: Seward v. Santander, No. 23-0704, 2025 WL 1350133 (Tex. May 9, 2025).This case involves a wrongful death, survival, and personal injury action arising from a shooting incident at a Home Depot store, where a detained suspected shoplifter, Armando Juarez, shot two police officers, killing one and injuring the other. The deceased officer’s parents and the injured officer sued the security guard, Chad Seward, who was an off-duty Dallas police officer, Home Depot, and Point 2 Point Global Security, Inc., alleging negligence and vicarious liability. The Supreme Court of Texas addressed whether Seward’s conduct was within the scope of his employment as a police officer, entitling him to dismissal under the Tort Claims Act, and whether to adopt the public-safety officer’s rule, which limits duties owed to responding officers. The Court concluded that Seward was acting within the scope of his police duties, as he had reasonable suspicion of theft, and adopted the public-safety officer’s rule, which restricts the duties owed to officers injured by alleged negligence that necessitated their response. Consequently, the Court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstated the trial court’s judgment dismissing the claims against Seward and granting summary judgment in favor of the other defendants.

Tort Claims Act: City of Houston v. Manning, No. 24-0428, 2025 WL 1478506 (Tex. May 23, 2025). This case involves a motorist, Chelsea Manning, who sued the City of Houston after a collision between her vehicle and a fire truck operated by the Houston Fire Department. Manning alleged negligence and negligence per se, claiming the fire truck driver violated statutory standards of care under the Texas Transportation Code. The Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) was invoked to waive governmental immunity for these claims. The trial court denied the city’s motion for summary judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the TTCA waives immunity for negligence per se claims. The Supreme Court of Texas agreed, stating that negligence per se is a method of proving a breach of duty, which falls within the TTCA’s waiver of immunity. The case was vacated in part and remanded for reconsideration of issues related to official immunity and exceptions under recent decisions.

Tort Claims Act: City of Houston v. Kelly, No. 01-24-00057-CV, 2025 WL 1521542 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 29, 2025) (mem. op.). Melissa Kelly, employed by Southwest Airlines as a ramp agent, was injured at William P. Hobby Airport, which is owned by the City of Houston, when a metal door of a water cabinet closed on her hand. Kelly sued the city, claiming that the city’s governmental immunity was waived under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) due to a premises defect. The city filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that Kelly’s claims did not fall within the TTCA’s immunity waiver, particularly challenging her status as an invitee and the city’s actual knowledge of the dangerous condition. The trial court denied the city’s plea, and the city appealed.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision, rejecting the city’s arguments. The appellate court found that Kelly sufficiently alleged she was an invitee because Southwest paid the City for the use of the premises, which meant she did not need to prove the City had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition. The court also concluded that Kelly’s allegations were sufficient to demonstrate that the water cabinet door presented an unreasonable risk of harm and that the City failed to identify any specific TTCA exceptions that Kelly needed to negate.  Furthermore, the City’s plea to the jurisdiction was not entitled to dismissal.

Texas Torts Claims Act: City of Houston v. Johnson, No. 01-23-00356-CV, 2025 WL 1521763 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 29, 2025) (mem. op.). This case involves a motor-vehicle collision between a Houston Police Department officer, Michael Doyle Cater Jr., and Jarrett Johnson. The collision occurred when Cater, responding to a call about a shooting, ran a red light and collided with Johnson’s vehicle, which had a green light. Johnson alleged that Cater was speeding and did not have his siren on, while Cater provided inconsistent accounts of his speed and the use of his siren. Johnson sued the city, claiming vicarious liability under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) for Cater’s negligent operation of his patrol vehicle. The city moved for summary judgment, asserting governmental immunity based on official immunity for Cater and the TTCA’s emergency exception. The trial court denied the motion, and the City appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying summary judgment.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment. The appellate court found that factual disputes existed regarding Cater’s speed, use of the siren, and whether he slowed down and looked for oncoming traffic before running the red light, which precluded summary judgment. The court concluded that the city did not conclusively establish that Cater acted in good faith, a requirement for official immunity, nor did it establish compliance with the TTCA’s emergency exception. The court also noted that the evidence, including a crash report and testimony, raised fact issues about whether Cater’s actions proximately caused Johnson’s injuries. Consequently, the court held that the city was not entitled to governmental immunity at this stage.

Public Information Act: Town of Northlake and Mayor Brian Montini v. George Roland, No. 02-24-00577-CV, 2025 WL 1536398 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 29, 2025) (mem. op.). This case involves an interlocutory appeal concerning the Public Information Act and Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 2.1396, which entitles individuals stopped or arrested for intoxication offenses to receive certain video footage. George Roland, an attorney, sued the Town of Northlake, and its mayor for failing to produce a video of his client and mischaracterizing his request as a public information request. The town released the video following an attorney general’s decision, leading to claims of mootness and immunity. The trial court granted the mayor’s plea to the jurisdiction but denied the town’s plea, prompting appeals from both parties. The appellate court affirmed the mayor’s plea, reversed the town’s plea, and dismissed Roland’s claims against both the town and the mayor. Roland’s request for mandamus relief was deemed moot as the video had been released, and his claims for injunctive relief did not establish a waiver of immunity.

Tort Claims Act: City of Austin v. Miller, No. 03-24-00385-CV, 2025 WL 1262415 (Tex. App. —Austin May 1, 2025). Katherine Miller sued the City of Austin under theories of strict liability and negligence for personal injuries she sustained from a dog bite during an adoption event hosted by the city’s animal center. The city, in response, filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing it was immune from suit under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) because it was performing a governmental function, specifically animal control, for which immunity is not waived and that the dog was not “tangible personal property” under the TTCA. After a hearing, the trial court denied the city’s plea, and the city appealed.

In reversing in part and affirming in part, the court of appeals first held that the TTCA does not waive the city’s immunity for Miller’s strict-liability claim because the TTCA requires a showing of proximate cause, which is not applicable to strict-liability claims. However, the court concluded that the city’s actions in using the dog for public attraction purposes constituted a “use” of tangible personal property under Section 101.021(2) of the TTCA. Further, Miller sufficiently alleged that the city’s use of the dog proximately caused her injuries, thus waiving the city’s immunity for her negligence claims.

Employment: Mayers v. United Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 04-23-01096-CV, 2025 WL 1512199 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 28, 2025) (mem. op.). Patricia Mayers, a teacher with United Independent School District (UISD), filed a lawsuit against UISD alleging sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of UISD, and Mayers appealed. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding that Mayers failed to present sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding her claims. Specifically, Mayers did not provide evidence of an adverse employment action or that similarly situated employees outside her protected class were treated more favorably. Additionally, Mayers did not demonstrate that UISD’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her transfer—poor performance—was a pretext for discrimination or retaliation. The court concluded that Mayers did not meet her burden of proof for her claims, and thus, summary judgment was properly granted.

Tort Claims Act: City of Dallas v. Hogue, No. 05-24-00520-CV, 2025 WL 1314105 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 6, 2025) (mem. op.). Robert Hogue sued the City of Dallas for injuries sustained while riding his bicycle on city-owned property, where he fell into a hole off a roadway which he claimed was an excavation. Hogue alleged premises liability under the Texas Tort Claims Act and later amended his petition to include a gross negligence claim. In response, the city filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting governmental immunity, but it was denied, leading to this appeal.

The court of appeals determined that the Texas Recreational Use Statute applied to Hogue’s claims because he was engaged in recreational activity, specifically bicycling, on city-owned land at the time of the accident. Addressing Hogue’s gross negligence claim, the court concluded that the city met its burden of proving it was not grossly negligent, as there was no evidence of an extreme risk or that the city had actual knowledge of the excavation prior to Hogue’s accident, as evidenced by the lack of prior reports or complaints about the condition. For those reasons, the court reversed the lower court’s order and rendered judgment dismissing Hogue’s claims with prejudice for want of subject matter jurisdiction.

Employment: Greig v. Tex. A&M Univ. Texarkana, No. 06-24-00063-CV, 2025 WL 1318041 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May 7, 2025) (mem. op.). Carl Greig appealed the trial court’s decision to dismiss his employment discrimination claims against Texas A&M University Texarkana (TAMUT) based on the election-of-remedies provision in the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). Greig had previously filed a federal lawsuit alleging race and age discrimination under Title VII and the TCHRA, but he amended his federal complaint to remove the TCHRA claims after TAMUT filed a motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. He then filed a state court suit under the TCHRA based on the same facts, which TAMUT argued was barred by the election-of-remedies provision.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal, agreeing that Section 21.211 of the Texas Labor Code barred Greig’s state claims because he had already initiated a federal action based on the same grievance. The court referenced the Texas Supreme Court’s interpretation that filing a federal cause of action precludes a duplicative TCHRA claim. Greig’s argument that Section 21.211 only applied to state or municipal actions was rejected, as the court found that the statute barred state actions following the initiation of a federal suit.

Tort Claims Act: Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Smithson, No. 07-24-00032-CV, 2025 WL 1417173 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 15, 2025) (mem. op.). The Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) appealed a jury verdict awarding Russell Smithson damages for injuries sustained in a motorcycle accident, arguing that the road condition was not a special defect and that Smithson failed to prove TxDOT’s actual or constructive knowledge of the defect. Smithson claimed the accident was caused by a severe height differential between lanes on State Highway 199, which he did not see at the time of the accident. The jury found both parties negligent, assigning 65% fault to TxDOT and awarding Smithson $636,336, later reduced to $250,000 under the Texas Tort Claims Act. The appellate court concluded that Smithson did not provide sufficient evidence to establish TxDOT’s actual or constructive knowledge of the defect, because there was no direct evidence of: (1) who applied red paint marking the defect or when it was applied to establish actual knowledge; nor (2) how long the condition existed to establish constructive knowledge. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court’s judgment, rendering that Smithson take nothing by his claims.

Criminal Procedure: State v. Lankford, No. 08-24-00089-CR, 2025 WL 1508802 (Tex. App.—El Paso May 27, 2025) (mem. op.). The State of Texas appealed the trial court’s decision to grant Bobbie Lankford’s pretrial motion to suppress evidence obtained from two search warrants. The first warrant authorized the search of Lankford’s residence and the seizure of electronic devices, but did not authorize a forensic examination of the devices. The second warrant, issued later, authorized a forensic examination of a specific cell phone. Lankford argued that the first warrant was invalid and that the evidence obtained from the forensic examinations should be suppressed. The trial court agreed, finding that the first warrant was not compliant with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Section 18.0215 and that the results of both forensic examinations were illegally obtained.

The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision to suppress the results of the forensic examination conducted under the second search warrant. The appellate court found that the first search warrant was valid for the seizure of electronic devices but did not authorize a forensic examination of their contents. However, the second search warrant was independently sourced and supported by probable cause, separate from the results of the first forensic examination. Therefore, the results of the second forensic examination were admissible under the independent source doctrine. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order in all other respects and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Inverse Condemnation: City of Houston v. Festival Properties, Inc., No. 09-24-00158-CV, 2025 WL 1255405 (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 1, 2025) (mem. op.). Festival Properties, Inc. owns a 10.446-acre property in Montgomery County, Texas, which includes a multiplex movie theater. The City of Houston initiated the Northpark Drive Project, expanding Northpark Drive into a six-lane highway, which involved closing two “Critical Drives” that provided direct access to Festival’s property. 2 Festival claimed this closure impaired the property’s use and sought over $1,000,000 in damages for inverse condemnation. The city filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing governmental immunity and that Festival’s access was not materially and substantially impaired since other access points remained. The trial court denied the city’s plea, leading to this interlocutory appeal.

The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision, concluding that Festival’s petition did not allege a viable claim for inverse condemnation. The appellate court found that the remaining access points provided reasonable access to the property, and the changes in traffic patterns did not constitute a material and substantial impairment. Consequently, the court rendered judgment dismissing Festival’s claims for lack of jurisdiction, as the pleadings affirmatively negated jurisdiction and did not warrant an opportunity to amend.

Land Use: Turk-Am Phoenix Properties, Inc. v. City of Bryan, No. 10-24-00168-CV, 2025 WL 1340532 (Tex. App.—Waco May 8, 2025) (mem. op.). Turk-Am Phoenix Properties, Inc., a Texas nonprofit corporation, appealed a trial court’s order affirming a demolition order by the City of Bryan’s Building and Standards Commission. The commission ordered the demolition of Turk-Am’s building, which was deemed unsafe and dilapidated, after Turk-Am failed to provide a plan for repairs by the required deadline. Turk-Am argued that it was not given sufficient time to complete an engineering report and obtain repair bids before the demolition order was issued. The court found that Turk-Am had received adequate notice and time, from August 29 to December 12, to prepare and submit the necessary documentation. The commission determined that repairs would exceed the building’s value and were not feasible under city ordinances. The appellate court concluded that the commission’s decision to deny a continuance was not arbitrary or unreasonable and affirmed the trial court’s order.

Employment: Gregory Moliere v. City of Buffalo, No. 10-22-00391-CV, 2025 WL 1523015 (Tex. App.—Waco May 29, 2025) (mem. op.). Gregory Moliere, a former police officer with the City of Buffalo, was terminated following a high-speed chase incident, which led him to file a declaratory judgment suit against the city and the mayor, claiming they lacked the authority to terminate him. The trial court dismissed Moliere’s claims, citing governmental immunity, and this decision was initially reversed by the court of appeals, which found a fact question regarding the city council’s authority. However, the Texas Supreme Court later ruled that the city council did have the authority to terminate Moliere, reversing the court of appeals’ decision and remanding the case for further proceedings on Moliere’s due process claim. On remand, Moliere argued that he was denied due process as per the Texas Government Code and the city’s manuals, but the court of appeals found that the city and mayor complied with the necessary statutory and constitutional provisions. Consequently, Moliere’s ultra vires claim was not valid, and governmental immunity was not waived, leading the court to affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Inverse Condemnation: Mendoza v. Angelina County, No. 12-24-00211-CV, 2025 WL 1463198 (Tex. App.—Tyler May 21, 2025).Arturo Torres Mendoza and Maria Azucena Mendoza purchased a 62-acre tract of land in Angelina County, Texas, in 2016, which included an easement known as “Sid Love Road” granted in 1981. In 2023, Angelina County personnel removed fences along Sid Love Road, claiming it was a public county road. The Mendozas sued the county, seeking a declaration of their property rights and alleging inverse condemnation. The county asserted several affirmative defenses, including sovereign immunity and prescriptive easement. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the county and denied the Mendozas’ motion for summary judgment.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision in part, reversed and rendered in part, and reversed and remanded in part.  The appellate court upheld the summary judgment for the county based on sovereign immunity, barring the Mendozas’ declaratory judgment claims. However, it found that the county failed to conclusively establish its affirmative defenses of prescriptive easement and easement by estoppel, reversing the summary judgment on these defenses. The court also reversed the summary judgment on the statute of limitations defense, as the county did not meet its burden to establish the claim’s accrual date. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the inverse condemnation claim.

Civil Service: City of Brownsville Firemen’s & Policemen’s Civ. Serv. Commn v. Culver, No. 13-24-00310-CV, 2025 WL 1338098 (Tex. App.— Corpus Christi-Edinburgh May 8, 2025) (mem. op.). Frank Culver, a former police officer with the Brownsville Police Department (BPD), sought to have his prior service time credited toward his longevity and seniority after being rehired by the BPD in 2016, following a resignation in 2007 to join the United States Border Patrol.  Culver’s request was initially granted by the City of Brownsville Firemen’s and Policemen’s Civil Service Commission (the Commission) in April 2019 but was later rescinded due to a conflict of interest. The Commission’s subsequent decision in June 2019 approved Culver’s request pending the City Manager’s determination, which was ultimately denied in April 2020 because Culver did not apply for reappointment within twelve months of his resignation, as required by the Commission’s rules. Culver filed a lawsuit on November 17, 2021, seeking a writ of mandamus, declaratory relief, and damages, arguing that the Commission had a ministerial duty to grant his request. The trial court denied the City’s plea to the jurisdiction, leading to this appeal.

The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision, granting the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing Culver’s claims with prejudice.  The court found that the actions Culver sought to compel were not ministerial, as the Commission had satisfied its duty by making a decision on his request, albeit conditional on the City Manager’s approval. The court also determined that Culver was not entitled to prior service time credit under the Commission’s rules, as he did not apply for reappointment within the required twelve-month period after his resignation.  Additionally, the court concluded that the Commission did not have a ministerial duty to schedule an appeal of the City Manager’s decision, as it was not a disciplinary decision subject to the Commission’s rules.

Torts Claims Act: Serna v. Harris Cnty. Texas, No. 14-24-00037-CV, 2025 WL 1337575 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 8, 2025) (mem. op.). Erica Serna was injured when she fell on a sidewalk in downtown Houston after stepping into an uncovered water main valve, leading to injuries on her left knee, left shin, right hand, and both wrists. She sued Harris County, alleging the uncovered valve was a premises defect and/or a special defect, claiming the county had a duty to inspect and warn of such hazards. The county filed a hybrid plea to the jurisdiction and a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, dismissing Serna’s claims against the county. Serna appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by dismissing her claims, particularly her special-defect claim, as she believed she raised a fact issue regarding the county’s knowledge of the defect.

The appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment in part, affirming in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings limited to Serna’s special-defect claim. The court found that the county did not address the special-defect theory in its summary-judgment motion, and thus, the trial court erred by dismissing this claim. The appellate court sustained Serna’s issue regarding the special-defect theory but overruled her other theories of liability against the county.

Exhaustion of Remedies: Tex. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. San Antonio Bay Estuarine Waterkeeper, No. 15-24-00036-CV, 2025 WL 1442924 (Tex. App. [15th Dist.] May 20, 2025). Max Midstream LLC applied for a minor source air permit to expand its Seahawk Terminal, which was granted by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ). Other parties, including San Antonio Bay Estuarine Waterkeeper (the “Challengers”), opposed the permit and requested a contested case hearing, which the Commission denied, leading them to file for judicial review. The trial court reversed the Commission’s decision, ordering a contested case hearing, but TCEQ and Max Midstream appealed this ruling.

On appeal, the court focused on whether the Commission’s denial of the contested case hearing was supported by substantial evidence. The appellate court found that the Commission’s decision was, in fact, based on substantial evidence, including expert affidavits and air quality modeling, which indicated that emissions would not significantly impact the health or welfare of the Challengers. The court also determined that the Commission did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in denying affected person status to the Challengers. Critically, the appellate court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to review the merits of the air permit because the Challengers had not exhausted all administrative remedies, including participating in a contested case hearing. The fact that the Challengers had sought a contested case hearing that was denied by the Commission was not sufficient for exhaustion. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment and affirmed the Commission’s order.