Monthly Newsletter

Notice and Announcements

2026 TCAA Summer Conference

The 2026 TCAA Summer Conference will be held at the Moody Gardens Hotel in Galveston June 24-26.

The TCAA Summer Conference is the best CLE program created specifically for municipal lawyers. Earn up to 12.25 hours MCLE credit (including 2.75 ethics hours)! Bring the family to experience everything Moody Gardens has to offer and join us as we continue the TCAA tradition of excellence.

For more information, including housing, and to register for this conference, please go to: https://texascityattorneys.org/2026-summer-conference/.

Conference Topics Include:

• Legislative Update and Forecast
• First and Second Amendment Auditors
• Enforcing Solid Waste Franchise Agreements
• Councilmember Conduct
• Use of Generative AI
• Construction Issues
• Animal Ordinances
• And more!

Last Call for Award Nominations

Last Call for Scholarship Applications

TCAA Paralegal Program 

The Texas City Attorneys Association (TCAA) is excited to offer its eighth webinar in its Paralegal Program. The AI in Government Offices: Practical Use Cases and Cautions webinar will take place on Tuesday, April 28, 2026, from 12:00 p.m. to 1:00 p.m. The course is free for TCAA members and $40 for nonmembers.

Click here to register. Please email TCAA at tcaa@tml.org for questions.

2026 TCAA Fall Conference: Call for Speakers

The Texas City Attorneys Association invites all attorneys interested in presenting at the 2026 TCAA Fall Conference, in San Antonio, to submit your ideas at https://texascityattorneys.org/speakers/ by May 29.  This year’s conference will be held on November 12, 2026. Questions? Contact TCAA@tml.org.

SAVE THE DATE: 2026 TCAA Fall Conference

The 2026 TCAA Fall Conference will take place on November 12, 2026, in San Antonio, and will be held in conjunction with the TML Annual Conference.

90^th Legislative Session

The 2027 legislative session began on January 12. Stay informed by checking TML’s Legislative Update weekly for summaries of city-related bills and associated articles.

TCAA Online Membership Directory

Looking to find the contact information for a fellow TCAA member? You can find it using the TCAA membership directory, available here.

IMLA Membership 

Membership with IMLA doesn’t just mean discounts to their events. It’s much more than that. Click here to view a quick video about IMLA membership.

Continuing Legal Education

2025 Fall Conference, 2025 Summer Conference, 2026 Riley Fletcher Seminar, and Paralegal Program Webinars 

These TCAA online seminars are FREE, allowing TCAA members who are city attorneys, assistant city attorneys, or attorneys who regularly practice municipal law to view the videos from the conferences in a single–session format. Viewing a session allows attorneys to receive participatory CLE credit with the State Bar. To view these seminars, please visit https://vimeo.com/tcaawebinars/collections. If you need the password, please email TCAA@tml.org. 

Compiled Case Summary List Now Available

Access to compiled city-related cases from 2017-present can be found here.

Articles

If you would like to have an article considered for publication in the TCAA newsletter, please send your request to Amber McKeon-Mueller at amber@tml.org.

New Supreme Court Qualified Immunity Case

By Amanda Karras, International Municipal Lawyers Association

Today, in a 6-3 per curiam (unauthored) opinion, the Supreme Court in Zorn v. Linton summarily reversed the Second Circuit’s denial of qualified immunity for a police officer who was alleged to have engaged in excessive force based on his use of a rear wristlock on a non-violent protestor.

This case involves a group of about 200 protestors who staged a sit-in during the January 2015 inauguration of then-Governor Peter Shumlin.  When the capitol closed to the public for the night, the police officers informed the protestors that they would be arrested for trespass if they did not leave.  Around 30 protestors remained at this point.  Some left, some were escorted out without force, but others, like Ms. Linton, refused to stand and leave and had to be forcibly removed.

After removing approximately a dozen protestors, the officers turned to Ms. Linton, and she remained seated with her arms interlocked with those of her fellow protestors.  Officer Zorn unlinked her arm from another protester’s and put it in a rear wristlock, twisting her arm behind her back.  She yelled “ow, ow, ow,” while Officer Zorn repeatedly asked her to “please stand up.”  She responded, “I will not stand up.”  Officer Zorn tried asking again and indicated he would need to use “more pain compliance” if she did not stand.  She refused, so Officer Zorn placed pressure on her wrist and lifted her by her underarm.  Once she was on her feet, she jerked her arms and fell back to the floor (in her complaint, she says due to the pain). Officer Zorn once again asked her to stand up, and when she refused, three officers picked her up and carried her outside. 

She sued for excessive force under §1983, alleging physical injuries related to the wristlock as well as PTSD.  The district court granted the officer qualified immunity and the Second Circuit reversed.  In denying qualified immunity, the Second Circuit relied on Amnesty America v. West Hartford, 361 F. 3d 113 (2004), to conclude that it was clearly established that the “gratuitous use of a rear wristlock on a protester passively resisting arrest constitutes excessive force.”

The Supreme Court summarily reversed the Second Circuit, concluding that the Amnesty America case did not clearly establish the law.  The Court noted that even if the case established the principle relied on by the Second Circuit, it “lacks the ‘high degree of specificity’ needed to make it ‘clear’ to officers which actions violate the law.”  citing Wesby, 583 U. S., at 63.  That is because the principle does not “obviously resolve whether using a rear wristlock to move a noncompliant protester after repeated warnings violates the Fourth Amendment.” 

Moreover, the Supreme Court noted that Amnesty America involved a wide range of allegations involving excessive force, which did include rear wristlocks, but also other things like ramming a protestor’s head into a wall and dragging another across the ground.  The Court further distinguished the cases as the officers in Amnesty America also did not give protestors any warning that they would use force.  The Supreme Court reasoned that a reasonable officer would not “interpret [Amnesty America] to establish that using a routine wristlock to move a resistant protester after warning her, without more, violates the Constitution.”  And here, the Court emphasized that Officer Zorn repeatedly warned Ms. Linton of the impending force if she continued to resist. 

Because the Second Circuit failed to identify a sufficiently similar case that violated the Constitution, the Supreme Court concluded the officer was entitled to qualified immunity.

Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson.  The dissent argued the Amnesty America case was sufficiently similar to clearly establish the law, and even if it wasn’t, the decision was “not so clearly erroneous as to warrant the extraordinary remedy of a summary reversal.” 

As Justice Sotomayor alludes to in her dissent, a summary reversal is an extraordinary measure because the Court issues essentially an error correction decision without the benefit of merits briefing or oral argument in these cases. For that reason, a summary reversal is quite unusual.  That said, for several years, the Court issued summary reversals in favor of police officers in qualified immunity cases almost once a term.  See Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4 (2021); Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100 (2018) (per curiam); White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73 (2017) (per curiam); Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015) (per curiam). 

Around 2018-2020 there was a big cross-ideological push to abolish qualified immunity.  This culminated in several petitions in the summer of 2020 asking the Court to grant certiorari to abolish qualified immunity.  One petition, Baxter v. Bracey, was relisted approximately 6-8 times (meaning the Justices continued to consider the issue at subsequent conferences and indicates a high degree of interest).  Then, in June of 2020, the petition was denied.  Justice Thomas, wrote a dissent from denial which reiterated his previously expressed doubts about qualified immunity as atextual.  While we don’t know why a petition is denied, there was discussion at the time of Congress acting in this space and so it’s possible the Court wanted to wait to see if Congress would pass legislation related to qualified immunity. 

Since Rivas, I am not aware of another summary reversal by the Court on qualified immunity.  The lack of decisions may have resulted in some quieting by those seeking to abolish qualified immunity.   It is possible that with this new decision today, we will see a renewed push by advocates to get the Court to abolish qualified immunity. 

A couple of other items to note.  First, the Court continues to indicate that it has never decided what type of case law can establish the law for qualified immunity purposes, but assumed without answering that circuit precedent can.  Second, in reversing the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court found that Amnesty America did not hold that the officers’ actions violated the Fourth Amendment, but it instead remanded for a jury trial because a “reasonable jury could . . . find that the officers gratuitously inflicted pain,” it was also “entirely possible that a reasonable jury would find . . . that the police officers’ use of force was objectively reasonable given the circumstances.”  The dissent points out that these statements merely reflect the summary judgment standard and factual uncertainty at this stage.  While that point is well-taken, this statement by the majority may be helpful in seeking qualified immunity for officers and to argue that a particular case did not clearly establish the law.

Here is the opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-297_bqm2.pdf

Supreme Court Decides Olivier v. City of Brandon – 1983 Case Involving Heck

By Amanda Karras, International Municipal Lawyers Association

The Supreme Court held today in Olivier v. City of Brandon that Heck v. Humphrey does not bar a §1983 suit seeking purely prospective relief.  This was the case involving the street preacher who had been convicted of violating the City’s ordinance restricting expressive activity near the public amphitheater (the restriction applied in a content neutral manner).  Olivier wanted to return to the venue to continue to preach after his conviction, but without the threat of criminal punishment so he brought a §1983 action seeking only forward-looking relief, asked the court to declare the ordinance unconstitutional and prevent its enforcement against him.  The Fifth Circuit held that his claims were categorically barred by Heck, because if he succeeded it would “necessarily imply the invalidity” of his prior conviction.  Olivier argued that Heck’s bar should not apply in two circumstances, both present here: 1) where the individual is only seeking prospective relief; and 2) when the person was never in custody for his conviction and thus never had access to habeas proceedings.

In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Kagan, the Court held that Heck does not bar a lawsuit seeking purely prospective relief, assuming a credible threat of prosecution.  The Court reasoned that if he was not able to bring a prospective suit, he would be left with an “untenable choice” (referencing Greek mythology): “violate the law and suffer the consequences (the Scylla), or else give up what he takes to be his First Amendment rights (the Charybdis).”  This result was wholly consistent with the Court’s decision in Wooley v. Maynard, though that case was decided before Heck.  The Court concluded that Olivier was not challenging the “validity of his conviction or sentence,” which “falls outside habeas’s core – and likewise outside Heck’s concerns.” A prospective suit is not a collateral attack on the prior conviction, which therefore does not raise the concerns Heck did in terms of “parallel litigation” and “conflicting judgments.”

The Court rejected the City’s argument that hinged on the line from Heck that states: “When a state prisoner seeks damages in a §1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed.” (emphasis added).  The Court called this argument “fair”, but “hardly dispositive.”  Strictly speaking, the Court noted the language fits, but the Court explained that it has “often cautioned that general language in judicial opinions should be read as referring in context to circumstances similar to the circumstances then before the Court and not referring to quite different circumstances that the Court was not then considering.”  And here, the Court found “the sentence relied on swept a bit too broad.”  That is so because here, there is no “looking back” at the facts underlying the conviction, “even if as a kind of byproduct, success in it shows that something past should not have occurred.”  Thus, the Heck language should not apply here where the Court in Heck did not consider a forward-looking suit like this one.

The Court cabined its holding in two important ways.  First, it did not answer the second question about the application of the Heck bar in circumstances where the individual never had access to habeas because it found the first question fully disposed of the case. The Court also specifically noted that it was not saying that “every person can challenge his statute of conviction through a §1983 suit for wholly prospective relief” and instead, reserved the question of “whether a person may bring such a suit while he is in custody for violating the statute challenged.” 

The LGLC (NACo, NLC, IMLA, and ICMA) filed an amicus brief in this case.  Our concern was the exceptions to Heck advocated by Olivier would undermine principles of federalism and encourage costly federal litigation.  Attorney’s fees are available in §1983 lawsuits, so even though plaintiffs are not seeking damages when they bring prospective suits for injunctive relief, these suits can still be costly.  The decision is a loss on the first question, but the second question arguably had more severe potential consequences so the fact that the Court refrained from answering that question is ultimately a good thing for local governments.  The concern with the second question is there are a host of local government ordinances that impose criminal liability but are unlikely to result in any jail time where habeas would be available.  If these misdemeanor prosecutions could then be subject to §1983 lawsuits simply because the person was fined instead of jailed, local governments could have faced a deluge of lawsuits.  

You can read the decision here: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/24-993_10n2.pdf

You can read our amicus brief here: https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/24/24-993/380001/20251020093623063_24-993%20Amicus%20Brief%20of%20Local%20Governement%20Legal%20Center.pdf

TCAA/TML Legal Defense Program: Amicus Briefs and Comments Filed

TCAA, in conjunction with the Texas Municipal League, files amicus briefs and comments in support of cities on many issues. To keep up to date on the status of these issues, go to: https://www.tml.org/DocumentCenter/View/4986/Amicus-Brief-Update-August-2024.

Recent Federal Fifth Circuit and Texas Cases of Interest to Cities

Note: Included cases are from February 1, 2026, through February 28, 2026. These case summaries have been prepared with the assistance of AI.

City Charters

Recall Elections: City of Kingsville v. Tijerina, No. 13-25-00622-CV, 2026 WL 698283 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Mar. 12, 2026) (mem. op.). This case involves a dispute over whether Selina Tijerina complied with the City of Kingsville’s charter requirements to initiate a recall election for three city commissioners: Norma Nelda Alvarez, Hector M. Hinojosa, and Lionel “Leo” H. Alarcon. Tijerina filed an affidavit on May 6, 2025, to recall the commissioners, and the city secretary provided her with petition blanks the following day. Tijerina returned the recall petitions on June 6, 2025, which was thirty-one days after the affidavit was filed. The city commission, after receiving certification from the city secretary that the petitions had sufficient signatures, voted to reject the recall petition. Tijerina then filed a petition for writ of mandamus, which the trial court granted, ordering the city commission to set a date for the recall election. The appellants, including the city and the commissioners, argued that the petition was untimely filed, and thus the trial court erred in issuing the writ.

The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by issuing the writ of mandamus. The appellate court found that the charter’s language was unambiguous in requiring recall petitions to be filed within thirty days of the affidavit’s filing. Since Tijerina filed the petitions on the thirty-first day, the court concluded that the city commission had no duty to act on the untimely petition. Consequently, the appellate court dissolved the writ of mandamus.

Civil Rights

Fourth Amendment; Second Amendment: United States v. Porter, 170 F.4th 381 (5th Cir. 2026).  Elijah Porter was charged with possession of a machinegun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) and challenged the denial of his motion to suppress vehicle-location data obtained from a license plate reader (LPR) and a firearm obtained in a vehicle search. The court found that the use of an LPR did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, as individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their movements on public roads. Officer Hoggard had reasonable suspicion to stop Porter’s vehicle based on an LPR hit revealing an outstanding arrest warrant for Porter. During the stop, Hoggard observed a firearm and a machinegun conversion switch in plain view under the driver’s seat, which fell within the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement. The district court found Hoggard’s testimony credible, despite the body camera footage being ambiguous. Porter’s Second Amendment challenge to § 922(o) was foreclosed by circuit precedent, which holds that machineguns do not receive Second Amendment protection. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings, including the denial of Porter’s motion to suppress and the constitutionality of § 922(o).

Employment

Employment Discrimination: Murphy v. Beaumont Independent School District, No. 24-40704, 2026 WL 802295 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 2026). Greg Murphy, an employee of Beaumont Independent School District (BISD), filed a civil rights lawsuit after being denied premium pay during the COVID-19 pandemic, which he claimed was owed to him per a BISD policy. The district court granted summary judgment to BISD, but the Fifth Circuit vacated this decision in part, finding that Murphy had a protected property interest in the premium pay and that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding a constitutional violation. Murphy also alleged retaliation by BISD after he circulated a petition for legal action, leading to a misconduct notice and his eventual termination following an arrest for making a terroristic threat, which he denied. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment on Murphy’s First and Fourth Amendment claims, agreeing with the district court that he failed to establish municipal liability under Monell for these claims. The Fifth Circuit found that there was insufficient evidence of a pattern of unconstitutional conduct or that BISD’s actions were substantially motivated by Murphy’s exercise of protected conduct. Additionally, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to grant qualified immunity to BISD’s superintendent, Shannon Allen, as Murphy failed to demonstrate a clearly established right that Allen violated. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Americans with Disabilities Act; Accommodations: Texas Dep’t of Ins. v. Thomas, No. 15-24-00073-CV, 2026 WL 784613 (Tex. App. [15th Dist.] Mar. 19, 2026). Som Thomas sued the Texas Department of Insurance (TDI) and three former supervisors, alleging termination due to disability, retaliation for requesting accommodations, and filing discrimination complaints under Chapter 21 of the Labor Code, the ADA, and the FMLA. The district court dismissed claims against the individual defendants but not TDI. Thomas took leave for prostate cancer surgery and requested accommodations upon return, which were not provided by his supervisors. He was reprimanded for his work performance and eventually terminated after not returning to work following a dispute over his employment status. TDI filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting immunity, which the trial court denied, leading to TDI’s appeal.

The appellate court determined it had jurisdiction over the federal claims but not the Chapter 21 claim, which was related to the same facts. The appellate court found that Congress did not validly abrogate state immunity under the FMLA’s self-care provision or the ADA, thus reversing the trial court’s decision on these claims. For the Chapter 21 claim, the appellate court concluded Thomas failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, as TDI provided a legitimate reason for termination. Ultimately, the appellate court reversed the district court’s order and rendered judgment dismissing Thomas’s claims against TDI.

Civil Service: Fenton Petry v. City of Houston, Texas and Police Officers and Firefighters Civil Service Commission, No. 14-25-00007-CV, 2026 WL 743501 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 17, 2026) (mem. op.). Fenton Petry, a firefighter, was temporarily suspended by the City of Houston after pleading guilty to a misdemeanor count of abuse of official capacity, following an initial felony charge of misuse of official information. The city cited Petry’s failure to abide by state laws, his conviction of an immoral or criminal act, and his failure to notify the fire chief of his conviction as reasons for the suspension. Petry appealed the suspension to an independent hearing examiner, arguing that he had complied with the notice requirement by informing his station captain, though the city disputed this claim. The hearing examiner ruled in favor of the city, finding that Petry did not provide the required written notice to the fire chief and that the suspension was timely under the 180-day rule. Petry then challenged the examiner’s award in district court, alleging that the examiner unlawfully considered evidence submitted outside the hearing. The district court dismissed Petry’s petition, granting the city’s plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment.

On appeal, Petry limited his challenge to whether there were grounds for an appeal of the examiner’s award, focusing on the alleged unlawful consideration of evidence. The court of appeals held that the city conclusively proved the examiner did not procure his decision through unlawful means, as the hearing remained open for additional evidence submission, and Petry had notice of this. The court also found that Petry’s arguments regarding ex parte communication and the 180-day rule did not demonstrate unlawful procurement of the examiner’s award. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment.

Immunity

Qualified Immunity: Anders v. Rumfield, No. 25-40387, 2026 WL 625638 (5th Cir. Mar. 5, 2026). This case involves an appeal by Larry and Nesa Anders against law enforcement officers Mike Rumfield and Dan Barringer, following the enforcement of a writ of execution to seize Larry Anders’ property. The writ was issued after a state court judgment against Larry Anders, which he appealed, but the writ was executed while the appeal was pending. Rumfield executed the writ by entering the Anders’ home without prior notice and seizing property, despite Larry’s attorneys asserting that all property was exempt or subject to a superior IRS lien. The property was sold at auction for less than $10,000, and the Anders sued for wrongful levy, conversion, conspiracy, and constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed all claims, and the Anders appealed the dismissal of their § 1983 claims.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, agreeing with the constables’ claim of qualified immunity, as their actions were within their discretionary authority and did not violate clearly established law. The Anders’ Fourteenth Amendment claim was forfeited due to inadequate briefing. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Anders’ § 1983 claims.

Excessive Force: Baker v. Coborn, No. 25-10545, 2026 WL 851947 (5th Cir. Mar. 27, 2026). Darion Baker and Gregory Dees stole a car in California and were confronted by police officers Richard Coborn and Michael McHugh in Stratford, Texas, while attempting to flee in the stolen vehicle. The officers fired shots at the vehicle, killing Baker, and his estate and family sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants claimed qualified immunity, and a panel of the Fifth Circuit initially held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity for shots fired before the car began moving but not for shots fired after the car moved away. On remand, the district court held that the alleged violation was clearly established, denying qualified immunity, and the officers appealed.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, finding that the second round of shots fired at the vehicle as it drove away was a clearly established Fourth Amendment violation, and thus, Coborn was not entitled to qualified immunity for the second round of shots. The order denying summary judgment was affirmed, but the Fifth Circuit expressed no view on the ultimate merits of any claim, which would be determined beyond the summary judgment stage.

Interlocal Agreements: Aransas County v. Western Steel Co. & T2J Partners, LLC, 2026 WL 691884 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2026). These accelerated interlocutory appeals involve payment disputes between Aransas County and various construction entities, including Western Steel Company and T2J Partners, LLC, for repair work following Hurricane Harvey at the Aransas County Airport and an administration building owned by Rockport-Fulton Independent School District. Aransas County argued that the trial court improperly denied its pleas to the jurisdiction based on governmental immunity. Western Steel and T2J Partners each argued separate statutory waivers of the county’s governmental immunity. The county had insured its properties through the Regional Pool Alliance (RPA), which was authorized to secure insurance and manage claims. After Hurricane Harvey, the RPA hired T2J as a general contractor, which in turn hired Western Steel. Both T2J and Western Steel claimed they were not paid for their work, leading to lawsuits against the county. The county contended it was immune from suit, arguing that the RPA was not its agent and that it had no obligation to obtain a payment bond. The trial court denied the county’s pleas to the jurisdiction, leading to these appeals.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s rulings, finding that the county waived its governmental immunity by appointing the RPA as its agent through the Confirmation of Coverage contract. This contract authorized the RPA to make repairs on behalf of the county, thereby binding the county to the contracts made by the RPA, including those with T2J and Western Steel. The court concluded that the county’s governmental immunity was waived, as the RPA acted with actual agency when it contracted with T2J to repair the County’s buildings. Additionally, the county was found to be liable under Texas Government Code § 2253 for failing to ensure a payment bond was executed, as it was treated as having made a contract with a prime contractor. Consequently, the county’s immunity to T2J’s breach of contract claim and Western Steel’s claims was waived.

Interlocal Agreements: Rockport-Fulton Indep. Sch. Dist. v. NorthStar Recovery Servs., Inc., No. 13-25-00168-CV, 2026 WL 698279 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Mar. 12, 2026) (mem. op.). This case involves an accelerated interlocutory appeal concerning payment disputes between Rockport-Fulton Independent School District (RFISD) and NorthStar Recovery Services, Inc. (NorthStar) related to repair work following Hurricane Harvey. RFISD, which insured its properties through the Regional Pool Alliance (RPA), a distinct intergovernmental unit, had the RPA hire NorthStar as a general contractor to perform repairs on RFISD property. NorthStar filed suit against RFISD and Aransas County for breach of contract, asserting that the RPA acted as RFISD’s agent when it hired NorthStar. RFISD filed a plea to the jurisdiction, claiming governmental immunity and arguing that it did not have a contract with NorthStar and that the RPA was not acting as its agent. The trial court denied RFISD’s plea, leading to this appeal.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision, concluding that RFISD waived its governmental immunity by designating an agent to make contracts on its behalf when its school board approved an agreement allowing the RPA to make repairs to its property. The court found that RFISD’s execution of the Interlocal Agreement with the RPA authorized the RPA to hire contractors like NorthStar on RFISD’s behalf, thus complying with legislative requirements for waiving immunity under Texas Local Government Code Chapter 271. Consequently, RFISD’s immunity was waived as to NorthStar’s breach of contract claim.

Interlocal Agreements: Aransas Cnty. v. NorthStar Recovery Services Inc., 2026 WL 700009 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2026) (mem. op.). This case involves a dispute between Aransas County and NorthStar Recovery Services Inc. over payment for repair work following Hurricane Harvey. Aransas County had insured its properties through the Regional Pool Alliance (RPA), which was authorized to manage insurance claims and contract directly with contractors like NorthStar. After NorthStar completed repair work, it claimed it was not paid by the RPA and sued the county, alleging that the RPA acted as the county’s agent. The county filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing it was immune from suit due to governmental immunity, but the trial court denied this plea. The county appealed, asserting that the RPA was not its agent because the county’s commissioners’ court did not explicitly vote to appoint the RPA as an agent.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding that the county waived its governmental immunity by authorizing the RPA to act as its agent through the coverage contract. The court determined that the county’s commissioners’ court had effectively appointed the RPA as its agent by voting to approve the contract, which allowed the RPA to make repairs on behalf of the county. The court concluded that the RPA acted with actual agency when it contracted with NorthStar, binding the county to the contract and waiving its immunity from NorthStar’s breach of contract claim.

Property Tax

Court Costs: Loudon v. Victoria County, 2026 WL 616054 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2026) (mem. op.). Kevin C. Loudon, the appellant, failed to pay property taxes for the years 2014, 2015, and 2016, leading Victoria County to initiate a delinquent tax suit in March 2017 under Chapter 33, Subchapter C of the Texas Tax Code. In July 2017, Loudon and the county entered into a payment agreement to settle the unpaid taxes and associated fees, but Loudon failed to pay the court costs, preventing the dismissal of the lawsuit. Although Loudon paid his taxes for 2020, 2021, and 2022, his 2023 taxes became delinquent on February 1, 2024. The county filed a motion for summary judgment in March 2024 to recover the outstanding balance of the 2023 delinquent taxes, penalties, interest, and attorney’s fees, which the trial court granted in April 2024, awarding the county $530.80.

On appeal, Loudon argued that the county was not entitled to collect both section 33.48 attorney’s fees and section 33.01 penalties and interest on his delinquent taxes, and that the county could not collect section 33.48 attorney’s fees on his 2023 delinquent taxes because those taxes became delinquent after the suit was filed in 2017. The appellate court disagreed with Loudon’s arguments, holding that the county was not precluded from obtaining section 33.48 attorney’s fees despite also obtaining section 33.01 penalties and interest, as section 33.01 does not prohibit the recovery of attorney’s fees. The court also found that the county was entitled to seek section 33.48 attorney’s fees for the 2023 taxes, as these taxes were merged into the suit when they became delinquent during the pendency of the lawsuit. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

Taxation of Exports: EOG Res. Mktg., LLC v. San Patricio Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 2026 WL 775771 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2026) (mem. op.). In this case, EOG Resources Marketing, LLC (EOG) challenged the San Patricio County Appraisal District’s (the county) assessment of taxes on crude oil stored in tanks at the Enbridge Terminal in Ingleside, Texas, during 2022 and 2023. EOG argued that the oil, which was pre-sold to foreign destinations and stored only until a sufficient quantity accumulated for shipping, should be immune from taxation under the Import-Export Clause of the U.S. Constitution. EOG supported its position with an affidavit from its Director for Marketing-Downstream Crude Oil, Jonathan Cave, who attested that the oil was sold to foreign countries and transported on foreign-owned vessels, which are prohibited by federal law from domestic transport. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, and the trial court ruled in favor of the county.

The appellate court reviewed the case de novo and reversed the trial court’s decision, granting summary judgment in favor of EOG. The appellate court held that crude oil pre-sold to foreign destinations and stored temporarily in holding tanks is immune from taxation under the Import-Export Clause, referencing recent similar decisions. The court also rejected the county’s counter-issue, which claimed EOG provided no firm evidence of the oil reaching foreign destinations, by affirming the validity of the evidence presented by EOG.

Open Government

Public Information Act: Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Tex. Tribune, No. 15-24-00010-CV, 2026 WL 628030 (Tex. App. [15th Dist.] Mar. 6, 2026). On May 24, 2022, a mass shooting at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde resulted in the deaths of nineteen children and two teachers, prompting extensive investigations into the incident and law enforcement’s response. Various news organizations filed a lawsuit seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) to disclose information under the Texas Public Information Act (PIA), which DPS withheld, citing the law enforcement exception. The trial court granted summary judgment for the News Organizations, ordering DPS to release the information, but DPS appealed, arguing that releasing the information would interfere with ongoing investigations and potential prosecutions.

The appellate court held that DPS provided sufficient evidence to support the law enforcement exception, allowing the case to proceed to trial rather than summary judgment. The appellate court also found that the trial court erred in ordering the release of materials not in DPS’s possession at the time of the PIA requests and those obtained from federal sources. The court affirmed the denial of Uvalde District Attorney Christina Mitchell’s plea in intervention, as her interests were adequately represented by DPS. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine the applicability of the law enforcement exception at trial. The appellate court emphasized that the information might not be permanently shielded from public view, but DPS had met its burden to avoid summary judgment at this stage.

Open Meetings Act; Standing: Castillo v. Smith, 2026 WL 842972 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2026). Ryan Smith, in his role as City Manager of Taft, Texas, filed a lawsuit against Elida Castillo, the Mayor of Taft, and other city officials, claiming they acted beyond their authority by altering the city’s government structure without proper notice, violating the Texas Open Meetings Act. Smith alleged that the officials held an unofficial meeting after a city council meeting on November 14, 2025, where they issued directives that undermined his authority. Smith sought a declaratory judgment and various injunctions. The city officials filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that Smith lacked standing to sue in his official capacity and that they had governmental immunity. The trial court denied both the officials’ plea to the jurisdiction and Smith’s motion for a temporary injunction, leading to this appeal.

The appellate court decided that Ryan Smith did not have standing to file the lawsuit in his official capacity as City Manager because he lacked the authority to bring the city into litigation without the city council’s approval. The court noted that Smith’s claims did not meet the criteria for ultra vires actions, which could bypass governmental immunity. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision, dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction and declaring all pending motions moot.

Public Safety

Code Enforcement: Cambric v. City of Corpus Christi, 170 F.4th 321 (5th Cir. 2026). Priscilla Tryon Cambric sued the City of Corpus Christi and two city employees, alleging selective enforcement of the city’s building code in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The district court dismissed her complaint for failure to state a claim, and Cambric appealed. Cambric’s property, known as the Ebony Recreation Spot, was cited multiple times for code violations, and the city recommended its demolition. Despite Cambric’s efforts to preserve the property as a historical landmark, the city enforced demolition orders, leading her to file a § 1983 claim alleging municipal liability for selective enforcement. The district court found that Cambric did not adequately plead a substantive constitutional violation, and thus did not address municipal liability.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo, focusing on whether Cambric sufficiently alleged a municipal policy or custom of selective enforcement. The court determined that Cambric’s allegations amounted to a single instance of uneven enforcement, which is insufficient to establish a custom or policy under § 1983. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Cambric’s claims against the city. Circuit Judge Oldham concurred, emphasizing the narrow circumstances under which a single incident can establish municipal liability.

Closing City Streets: City of Kemah v. Merger Three, LLC, No. 14-24-00829-CV, 2026 WL 740665 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 17, 2026). The City of Kemah, a Type A general-law municipality, passed Resolution No. 2024-10, restricting Sixth Street between Kipp Avenue and Bradford Avenue to pedestrians and emergency vehicles for ten years. The appellees, including Merger Three, LLC, and other property owners and tenants on the north side of Sixth Street, challenged the resolution, arguing it was void without their consent as required by Texas Transportation Code section 311.008. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming the city lacked authority to close the street and alternatively sought compensation for a taking. The trial court granted a temporary injunction to maintain the status quo before the resolution, prompting the city to appeal, arguing the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and abused its discretion.

The court of appeals held that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act to determine the validity of the ordinance as written but not to address the physical barriers blocking emergency vehicles. The appellate court agreed with the city that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the temporary injunction, as the appellees failed to show a probable right to relief. Citing Jordan v. Landry’s Seafood Restaurant, Inc., the court concluded that restricting a street to pedestrians and emergency vehicles does not constitute “closing” the street under Texas law. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s order, dissolved the temporary injunction, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Tort Claims Act

Recreational Use: City of San Antonio v. Realme, No. 24-0864, 2026 WL 706013 (Tex. Mar. 13, 2026). Nadine Realme participated in a community Thanksgiving “fun run” known as a turkey trot in a San Antonio park, where she tripped over a metal pole fragment, fell, and broke her arm. She sued the City of San Antonio, alleging that its negligent maintenance of the park caused her injury. The city argued that her negligence claim was barred by the Recreational Use Statute, which limits liability for ordinary negligence when a person engages in recreation on government property. The trial court sided with Realme, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that the fun run did not qualify as “recreation” under the statute. The city filed a petition for review, which was granted.

The Supreme Court of Texas held that the community fun run was plainly “recreation” under the Texas Recreational Use Statute, given that people and families participate for enjoyment, frivolity, and amusement over the Thanksgiving holiday. The court reversed the appellate decision and rendered judgment for the city regarding the ordinary negligence claim. The court remanded the case to the appellate court to consider Realme’s gross-negligence claim, which had not been addressed previously.

Recreational Use: City of Houston v. Ramos, No. 14-25-00473-CV, 2026 WL 806871 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 24, 2026) (mem. op). Alejandro Ramos died during a nighttime trail run at Lake Houston Wilderness Park, organized by Run in Texas, which did not submit a required safety plan to the City of Houston. His estate, represented by Fernando Ramos, along with Maria and Rodrigo Ramos, sued the city for premises liability under the Texas Tort Claims Act and the recreational use statute, alleging that the city failed to warn participants about unmarked trails that could lead to dangerous areas. The city filed a Rule 91a motion to dismiss, claiming governmental immunity, which the trial court denied, prompting the city to file an interlocutory appeal.

The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the Ramos failed to establish proximate cause between the city’s actions and Alejandro Ramos’s death. The court concluded that the unmarked trails were not a substantial factor in causing the death, which was due to a genetic cardiac arrhythmia, and thus did not waive the city’s immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act. Consequently, the appellate court rendered judgment dismissing Ramos’ premises liability claim.

Causation; Emergency Response Exception: City of Mission v. Rodriguez, No. 13-24-00585-CV, 2026 WL 775770 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Mar. 19, 2026) (mem. op.). Enrique Maximus Rodriguez filed a lawsuit against the City of Mission after being injured in a collision with a vehicle driven by Samuel Martinez, who was fleeing from a police officer employed by the city. The incident occurred on September 21, 2021, when Officer Samuel Monjaras initiated a high-speed chase of Martinez for a minor traffic violation. Rodriguez, unaware of the chase, was struck by Martinez’s vehicle at an intersection, resulting in severe injuries. The trial court denied the city’s plea to the jurisdiction, which argued that the city was immune from the lawsuit.

The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision, finding that Rodriguez did not establish a sufficient nexus between his injuries and Officer Monjaras’s use of the police vehicle to waive the city’s governmental immunity. Additionally, the court determined that the emergency exception to immunity applied, as the pursuit of Martinez constituted an emergency situation. The court also noted that the city did not properly plead official immunity as a defense. The case was remanded to allow Rodriguez an opportunity to amend his pleadings.

Emergency Response Exception: City of Houston v. Varnado, No. 14-25-00394-CV, 2026 WL 586476 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 3, 2026) (mem. op.). Rodney Varnado filed a personal injury lawsuit against the City of Houston, alleging that the city caused a vehicle collision by engaging in an unnecessary high-speed chase of a third party, Jimmy Ferria, which resulted in Ferria colliding with Varnado. The city moved to dismiss the case under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, arguing that Varnado failed to allege facts to overcome the emergency-response and 9-1-1 emergency-service exceptions to the Texas Tort Claims Act’s (TTCA) waiver of governmental immunity. The trial court denied the city’s motion to dismiss, leading to this appeal.

The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, agreeing with the city that Varnado’s allegations plausibly implicated the emergency-response and 9-1-1 emergency-service exceptions to the TTCA’s waiver of immunity, and that Varnado failed to negate these exceptions. Consequently, the appellate court rendered judgment dismissing Varnado’s suit against the city for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Notice: City of Houston v. Pellott, No. 14-24-00940-CV, 2026 WL 776125 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 19, 2026). This case involves an interlocutory appeal by the City of Houston from the trial court’s denial of its Rule 91a motion to dismiss Pellott’s lawsuit. Pellott alleged that she was injured in a car accident involving a truck driven by Marcus Anderson, a Houston police officer, while he was acting within the scope of his employment. Pellott did not allege facts showing that she provided timely notice of her claim to the city or that the city had actual notice. The city filed special exceptions and a Rule 91a motion to dismiss, arguing that Pellott failed to demonstrate a waiver of the city’s governmental immunity and did not provide timely notice. The trial court denied the motion, leading to this appeal.

The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s order and rendered judgment dismissing Pellott’s claims with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The appellate court concluded that Pellott did not plead facts demonstrating that all jurisdictional prerequisites, including timely notice, were satisfied as required by the Texas Tort Claims Act. The court determined that Pellott had a reasonable opportunity to amend her petition but failed to address the notice deficiency, warranting dismissal with prejudice.

Negligence: City of Houston v. Fonteneaux, No. 14-25-00153-CV, 2026 WL 850700 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 26, 2026) (mem. op.). Sancelia Fonteneaux filed a negligence lawsuit against the City of Houston and the Metropolitan Transit Authority (“Metro”), alleging that she was injured when the door of a Metro bus closed on her arm as she attempted to board. Fonteneaux claimed that the bus was owned, operated, maintained, and/or driven by either the city or Metro, and that the defendants failed to exercise their duty of care, thus waiving governmental immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA). The city filed a Rule 91a motion to dismiss, arguing that Fonteneaux’s claims had no basis in law because they were based on the actions of Metro’s driver, and that the city had no control over Metro’s operations. The trial court denied the city’s motion to dismiss, and the city subsequently filed a traditional motion for partial summary judgment based on governmental immunity, which the trial court had not yet ruled on when the city filed this interlocutory appeal.

The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the city’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss. The appellate court concluded that Fonteneaux pleaded sufficient facts to withstand the motion to dismiss, as she alleged that the bus was owned, operated, maintained, and/or driven by the city or Metro, and that the city was negligent in its own right. The court noted that the city’s argument regarding Metro being a distinct legal entity did not address who employed the bus driver, and that evidence could not be considered in a Rule 91a motion. Additionally, the appellate court declined to address the merits of the city’s summary-judgment motion, as the trial court had not yet ruled on it, and there was no interlocutory order denying the motion over which the appellate court had jurisdiction.

Utilities

Land Use; Antitrust: Megatel Homes, L.L.C. v. City of Mansfield, Tex., No. 25-11006, 2026 WL 828414 (5th Cir. Mar. 26, 2026). Megatel Homes, L.L.C., and Cipriani Island Azure, L.L.C. (collectively, Megatel) sought to develop land in the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the City of Mansfield, Texas, and required water utility services from the Johnson County Special Utility District (JCSUD). JCSUD informed Megatel that it could not provide water services without Mansfield’s permission due to a contractual agreement between JCSUD and Mansfield. Mansfield demanded that Megatel consent to annexation, and pay various development fees, which led to unsuccessful negotiations. Megatel filed a lawsuit against Mansfield, alleging violations of the Sherman Act and state law claims for tortious interference, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. The district court dismissed Megatel’s Sherman Act claims, citing state-action immunity, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Texas Water Code did not provide Mansfield with state-action immunity because it did not clearly articulate a state policy allowing Mansfield to act anticompetitively. The Fifth Circuit found that the authority to monopolize water services was granted exclusively to JCSUD through a certificate of convenience and necessity. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision granting state-action immunity to Mansfield and remanded the case for further proceedings. Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit did not pass judgment on the merits of Megatel’s claims under the Sherman Act or state law.

Water Tap Fees: Southern Montgomery Cnty. Mun. Util. Dist. v. Grace Community Church-The Woodlands, Inc., 2026 WL 827119 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 26, 2026) (mem. op.). In this interlocutory appeal, Southern Montgomery County Municipal Utility District (the “district”) challenged the trial court’s denial of its plea to the jurisdiction, while Grace Community Church-The Woodlands, Inc. (the “church”) cross-appealed the trial court’s order granting the plea to the jurisdiction of the district’s directors. The underlying dispute arose from fees the district charged the church for installing a water service tap. The church alleged that these fees were unlawfully collected taxes disguised as “tap fees” and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming the fees exceeded actual installation costs and violated the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (TRFRA) and the First Amendment. The trial court denied the district’s plea to the jurisdiction but granted the directors’ plea, leading to the current appeal.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the district’s plea to the jurisdiction, finding that the church’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, TRFRA, and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were not barred by governmental immunity. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s grant of the directors’ plea to the jurisdiction, concluding that the directors’ immunity was derivative of the district’s and thus not greater. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, allowing the church’s claims against the directors and the district to proceed.

Water Rights Permitting: Tex. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, No. 15-24-00050-CV, 2026 WL 668291 (Tex. App. [15th Dist.] Mar. 10, 2026). The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) and the Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority (GBRA) appealed a district court’s judgment that reversed and remanded a TCEQ order granting a water-rights permit to GBRA. The district court found that TCEQ erred by not assessing the effects of GBRA’s proposed water diversions on fish and wildlife habitats, as required by the Texas Water Code. GBRA argued that the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) lacked standing, but the appellate court determined that NWF had standing due to the economic impact on one of its members, who owns a seafood business affected by changes in freshwater flows.

The appellate court concluded that TCEQ’s interpretation of the Water Code was erroneous, as it failed to conduct a site-specific assessment of the proposed diversions’ impact on fish and wildlife habitats. TCEQ’s reliance on environmental flow standards instead of site-specific assessments was deemed an error of law. The appellate court also addressed whether TCEQ’s approval of GBRA’s application without specific diversion points was arbitrary and capricious. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision to reverse the TCEQ order and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine if site-specific assessments are necessary. The appellate court emphasized that TCEQ must reconsider whether additional information on diversion locations is needed for conducting assessments. The decision highlights the importance of assessing environmental impacts in water-rights permitting processes.

Recent Texas Attorney General Opinions of Interest to Cities

Note: Included opinions are from March 1, 2026, through March 31, 2026.

KP-0519 (Elections): State inspectors are not prohibited, as a matter of law, from taking photographs and videos while observing election activities. Neither are poll watchers prohibited, as a matter of law, from observing election activities related to mail-in ballots.